Latest International Debates
The United States
and Iran:
Another Turning Point in a Volatile Relationship
Should the Senate Approve a Resolution Urging the United States to Designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a Terrorist Organization?
(Excerpted From International Debates, December 2007)
The United States has had stormy relations with Iran ever since Islamic fundamentalists
overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah in 1979 and, later that year, took 66 Americans in the
U.S. embassy in Tehran hostage for 444 days. During the 1980s, the United States
supported Iraq in its war against Iran. In the 1980s and 1990s, Iran’s involvement in
Shiite insurgencies, including Hezbollah activities in Lebanon, ran directly counter to
U.S. interests in the region.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions have also been a source of concern for the United States,
although Iranian officials contend that their nuclear program is purely for civilian energysupply
purposes. President George W. Bush has stated, however, that the United States
will not tolerate a nuclear-capable Iran. In response, Iran’s President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad has frequently used harsh rhetoric to denounce American foreign policy in
the Middle East.
Within the United States, a debate roils about how best to deal with Iran. Some
lawmakers, including many Democrats, argue that negotiation is the only effective way
of preventing Iran from undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East and keeping its
nuclear program in check. Others, including many Republicans in Congress and Bush
Administration officials, contend that the United States should take a hard line in dealing
with the Persians.
These two conflicting strategies were on display in September, when Senators
Joseph Lieberman (CT-ID) and Jon Kyl (AZ-R) proposed an amendment to a Department
of Defense authorization bill (in the form of a nonbinding sense of the Senate resolution)
urging the Bush Administration to label Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a foreign terrorist
organization under U.S. law.
Supporters of the amendment argued that designating the Republican Guard as a terrorist organization would be a clear
statement that Iran’s actions in Iraq constitute support for terrorism.
Opponents of the amendment countered that such a designation was not appropriate for a 180,000-member segment of a standing army of a nation — all the other entities on the terrorist list are nonstate organizations.
On September 26, the Senate passed the Lieberman-Kyle amendment by a vote of
76 to 22.
Armenian Genocide:
Congress Reconsiders a Perennial Question
Should the U.S. House of Representatives Approve a Resolution Labeling the Slaughter of Armenians During World War I Genocide?
(Excerpted From International Debates, November 2007)
The United Nations Convention on Genocide, adopted in 1948, defines genocide as acts committed with intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.” The term “genocide” did not exist during World War I, however, when the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Muslim Turks, carried out a policy to deport members of its Christian Armenian minority. Some 1.5 million Armenians died during forced marches to the border, when eyewitnesses reported massacres by Turkish troops. Atrocities against Armenians continued until the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the war.
Whether the deaths amounted to deliberate genocide has been a topic of heated debate ever since. More than 20 countries and the European Parliament (in 1987) have declared that genocide took place, while others, including the United States, have resisted calls to do so.
Ronald Reagan was the only American president to publicly call the killings genocide. When the issue last arose in 2000, a House committee approved an official declaration recognizing the Armenian genocide, but President Bill Clinton persuaded Congress to withdraw the measure when Turkey warned of canceling arms deals and withdrawing support for American air forces then patrolling northern Iraq.
In the current 110th Congress, the new Democratic majority, led by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (CA), revived the resolution, which the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved 27 to 21. The measure calls on the president to “accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide.”
Those who support the resolution maintain that it is important that Turkey recognize the genocide, apologize for it, and condemn it — just as the Germans have apologized for suffering inflicted on the Jews, and the Americans and the British have apologized for slavery.
Those opposed to the resolution insist that its passage would do serious damage to U.S. relations with an important ally in the “war on terror” and one that plays an important strategic role in supporting U.S. troops in the Middle East.
Others have characterized the current controversy as a defining moment in United States-Turkish relations. If that’s the case, the resolution’s opponents have prevailed — but only for now. Bowing to intense pressure, supporters of the resolution recently asked Speaker Pelosi not to schedule a vote at this time, but to continue to work toward consideration in the near future.
Evaluating the Surge:
Congress Considers the Reports of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
Has the U.S. “Surge” Strategy in Iraq Been Effective?
(Excerpted From International Debates, October 2007)
On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush addressed the Nation to announce a roughly 30,000 troop “surge” in U.S. military personnel in Iraq. In September, General David H. Petraeus, head of the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the lead strategist behind the plan, traveled to Capitol Hill to issue a much-anticipated progress report. He was joined by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker, who briefed members on the political situation.
Testifying at hearings before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and House of Representatives, Petraeus said that the military objectives of the surge “are in large part being met.” Although there are still areas of concern, he said, sectarian violence had declined over the past six months and Iraqi forces are taking a larger role in military activities.
Petraeus took particular note of recent success in the Iraqi province of Anbar, which had been considered firmly under the control of al Qaeda in Iraq—one of many terrorist groups and warring factions said to be fueling the insurgency in the country—at the beginning of the year. Since then, Sunni tribes in the area have rebelled against al Qaeda control and are cooperating with U.S. forces.
During questioning by members of the congressional committees, opponents of the war expressed doubts about the surge’s success. They cited a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report showing that the average number of daily attacks against Iraqi civilians had remained constant over the last six months. Even if “sectarian violence” had declined by U.S. calculations, the average Iraqi was no safer than he was prior to the troop increase.
In addition, opponents pointed to the lack of progress by the Iraqi Government in meeting numerous key benchmarks it had set in June 2006.
The purpose of the surge, they argued, was to give the Iraqi Government time and space to meet these benchmarks. The fact that little progress has been made in this area far overshadows any limited military success.
Despite the efforts of war opponents, there is little progress in Congress on proposals to mandate timelines for troop withdrawals beyond those put forth by Petraeus and endorsed by the Bush Administration. Any plan that did pass both houses of Congress would still face a veto by President Bush, a fate that befell the only successful attempt to tie troop withdrawals to war funding, passed by Congress in April.
The price tag for the war continues to rise. The Bush Administration recently requested an additional $190 billion in supplemental funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for 2008.
Myanmar/Burma
A Southeast Asian Nation in Turmoil
Should the UN Security Council Pass a Resolution Condemning Myanmar for Human Rights Violations and Urging Democratic Reforms?
(Excerpted From International Debates, September 2007)
Myanmar, also known as Burma, is located in a part of Asia that is rich in natural resources and economic potential. For more than five decades, however, the country has suffered from a political and economic crisis that has alienated it from the international community and turned it into one of the world’s poorest nations.
The British granted Burma independence in 1947, but in 1962, communist General Ne Win staged a coup, banned political opposition, suspended the constitution, and introduced “the Burmese way of socialism.” Since then, the country has been ruled by a succession of authoritarian military regimes dominated by the majority Burmese ethnic group. In 1988, responding to years of economic hardship and repression, the Burmese people held massive demonstrations. These were brutally quashed by the State Law and Order Council (SLORC), and in 1989, the military government officially changed the country’s name to Myanmar. (Burmese opposition groups continue to use “Burma” as do some Western governments, including the United States; the United Nations uses “Myanmar.”)
In 1990 elections, the opposition party — the National League for Democracy — won 60 percent of the vote; however, SLORC refused to recognize the results. The movement’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of Burma’s former leader, Aung San, who was assassinated in 1947) has spent more than 10 of the past 17 years in some form of detention or house arrest. In 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her nonviolent struggle against Myanmar’s military dictatorship, and world leaders have called for her release and for the release of other political prisoners. The United Nations estimates there are now 1,100 political prisoners in Myanmar.
In January 2007, the United Nations Security Council voted on a draft resolution, sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, calling on Myanmar to release all political prisoners unconditionally, begin widespread dialogue with dissident groups, and end its military attacks and human rights abuses against ethnic minorities. Although the resolution received nine favorable votes, permanent Security Council members Russia and China blocked it, exercising a double veto for the first time since 1972. Three members abstained.
Those favoring the resolution argued that it would send an important signal about the need for change in Myanmar. They charged that the military regime has arbitrarily attacked its own people, waged war on minorities, ignored increases in refugees, narcotics, and human trafficking, and allowed the spread of communicable diseases — a situation that poses security risks beyond Myanmar’s borders.
Myanmar’s ambassador countered that the resolution was based on “patently false” information and, citing UN Development Programme data, maintained that his country is making economic gains. China contended that Myanmar’s social and economic problems are internal and do not seriously threaten international peace. The Russian ambassador stated that the issue would be better handled by other UN organs, such as the Human Rights Council, or humanitarian agencies like the World Health Organization.
Following the vote, Britain’s ambassador said that, despite the resolution’s defeat, he saw positive elements in the outcome, since it made clear that there is broad concern among Security Council members about the plight of Myanmar’s people. Meanwhile, in recent weeks, rare public demonstrations have taken place in the country, with hundreds marching to protest the government’s doubling of fuel prices. It remains to be seen whether public anger will grow into a repeat of the 1988 anti-junta uprising.
The Falklands/Malvinas Islands
25 Years After War, the Dispute Continues
Does Argentina Have a Legitimate Territorial Claim to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands?
(Excerpted From International Debates, May 2007)
It’s been 25 years since the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic went to war in the South Atlantic over control of the Falkland Islands. More than 900 people died in the Falklands War, including 655 Argentines, 255 British troops, and three Falkland Islanders. The British lost six ships and 34 aircraft, while Argentina lost four ships, a submarine, and 99 aircraft. Since that time, there has been slow progress toward reconciliation, but bitter feelings remain.
Last June, the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (known informally as the Committee of 24 for the original number of its members) once again took up the issue of who should govern the Falklands — and, once again, the Argentine and British representatives expressed divergent viewpoints.
Jorge Enrique Taiana, Argentina’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the Malvinas Islands — the Argentines’ name for the Falklands — were part of an independent Argentina that had been separated, against their inhabitants’ will, by the United Kingdom in 1833.
Representatives of the British Government in the Falklands countered that the island group was unoccupied when the British colonized it, and that the sole claim Argentina had to them was through a Spanish colony that had been abandoned years before.
During the June 15, 2006, Special Committee on Decolonization meeting, several South American nations spoke out in favor of Argentina’s claims, while other nations urged the British and Argentine governments to continue a dialogue that had led to increased contacts between the Islands and Argentina and several agreements on issues of economic and environmental importance.
For both Britain and Argentina, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands continue to be a source of national identity. Britons take pride in the fact that they successfully defended a lonely outpost of their once-sprawling empire against foreign aggression. For the Argentines, the islands are a symbol of Western meddling, a painful reminder of military defeat, but also one of hope that someday Argentina will be able to reclaim what is rightfully theirs.
U.S.-Peru Relations
Expanding Free Trade in Latin America
Should the U.S. Congress Approve the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement?
(Excerpted From International Debates, April 2007)
With 28 million people, Peru is the fifth most populous country in Latin America. Although its economy is very small compared to that of the United States, its leading trading partner, Peru has undergone a period of expansion in recent years and is now one of the most liberal market economies in the region. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in 2005, U.S. exports to Peru totaled nearly $2.3 billion, while two-way trade between the two countries amounted to $7.4 billion.
In April 2006, Peru signed a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States — the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) — becoming the first country in the Andean Community of Nations to do so. The United States signed a similar agreement with Colombia in November 2006 and is currently in negotiations with Ecuador. Bolivia so far has only participated as an observer.
The PTPA will grant immediate duty-free access for 90 percent of combined U.S. and Peru tariff lines (items in a tariff schedule), address many nontariff barriers, and liberalize trade in services between the two nations. Upon implementation of the PTPA, 92 percent of qualifying “industrial and textile” goods and 78 percent of agricultural products will become duty-free. The agreement also contains provisions intended to expedite the movement of goods and the provision of services between the United States and Peru and to improve the regulatory climate for bilateral trade and investment.
The Peruvian Congress ratified the PTPA in June 2006. The U.S. Congress must also ratify the agreement before it can enter into force.
Supporters of the PTPA say that the agreement will promote increased economic activity and commercial prosperity for both nations — serving as a catalyst to further development and modernization of the Peruvian economy and expanding consumer choices and creating jobs in the United States.
Critics of the PTPA are concerned that it will worsen Peru’s problems with weak labor rights and expose the country’s subsistence farmers to disruptive competition from subsidized U.S. crops.
If Congress approves the PTPA, U.S. trade negotiators may use it as leverage to push for additional trade agreements that would create an even larger export market in the region.
Debating War Policy
Surge vs. Redeployment
Should the U.S. House of Representatives Disapprove President Bush‚s Proposed Troop Increase in Iraq?
(Excerpted From International Debates, March 2007)
Democrats swept to power in Congress during the midterm elections of 2006 due in large part to public frustration over the Bush Administration’s handling of the war in Iraq. Once they took over the congressional leadership in January, the focus turned to how — or if — Democrats should use their new legislative powers to reshape war policy.
Questions about the Democrats’ first step were answered following President George Bush’s January 10, 2007, televised address to the Nation announcing a more than 20,000 troop “surge” in U.S. military personnel in Iraq. House and Senate Democrats both began drafting nonbinding resolutions condemning what they termed an “escalation.” Although nonbinding congressional resolutions don’t impose enforceable power over the President, supporters argued that the measures would express the will of Congress, put public pressure on the administration, and lay the groundwork for additional legislative efforts to bring the troops home.
The House began debating the resolution on February 14, 2007, and continued for three days, during which nearly 400 members spoke on both sides of the question. Supporters argued that the war was started under false pretenses and managed poorly by the administration.
Opponents of the resolution countered that a nonbinding measure was a pointless waste of time that would only discourage U.S. troops currently in Iraq and embolden U.S. opponents, who would consider it evidence that America was losing its will to fight.
On February 16, by a vote of 246 to 182, the House passed the Iraq War Resolution. Seventeen Republicans broke ranks with their party and voted for the measure, while two Democrats voted against it. The following day, the Senate took up the House legislation, but supporters were once again unable to muster the 60 votes necessary to end debate.
With little chance of the anti-surge resolution ever reaching the president’s desk, opponents of the war are now considering other, enforceable ways to control U.S. military policy.
Internet Gambling
Global Trade Commitments Confront Public Morals
Do U.S. Policies Prohibiting Off-Shore Internet Gambling Violate World Trade Organization Agreements?
(Excerpted From International Debates, February 2007)
The expansive growth of gambling and the evolution of technology inevitably have converged to produce the world’s fastest-growing online industry: Internet gambling. Global revenues from this relatively recent phenomenon were $16 billion in 2006; estimates are that they will reach $150 billion by 2010.
The current legal status of online gambling in the United States is unclear — the international nature of the Internet makes prohibition easy to evade and difficult to enforce. There is no U.S. law specifically preventing gambling on the Internet, but some states have banned the practice or placed restrictions on it, and a few online casino operators have been prosecuted under the federal Wire Communications Act of 1961, which originally was written to cover telephone sports betting.
Most Internet gambling businesses are physically located outside the United States, especially in the Caribbean, where various forms of the practice are legal and regulated. In what has since evolved into a closely watched World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute, the U.S. Government in 2002 prosecuted an American operating an Internet gambling site in the Caribbean island nation of Antigua and Barbuda (where Internet gambling is the second-largest employer after tourism) for violating the Wire Act. The move was part of a U.S. crackdown on computer betting that, it was feared, would lure teenagers and fuel gambling addiction.
In response, Antigua and Barbuda, a member of the WTO, filed a complaint against the United States within that body, stating that Washington had violated its pledge in an earlier trade agreement to open the U.S. market in “recreational, cultural sporting services” to global competition.
In a November 2004 decision, a WTO dispute resolution panel sided with Antigua and Barbuda, ruling that U.S. laws limiting online gambling amounted to illegal trade restrictions. The administration of President George W. Bush appealed, and in a partial reversal of the earlier ruling, the WTO opened the door for the United States to regulate and restrict offshore gambling websites.
In addition to claiming that the United States violated free trade agreements, the Antiguans argued that U.S. Internet gambling policy was depriving the country of a significant amount of revenue.
For its part, the United States has insisted that it seeks to protect the public, not its domestic industry, and that providers of gambling services in the United States already operate under severe restrictions.
Many aspects of this dispute make it unique. For one thing, never before has the WTO ruled on the issue of public morals and whether they can excuse a trade restriction on that basis. This is also the first time that a tiny nation has brought a WTO complaint against the United States, and it’s possible that if Washington refuses to obey the WTO’s decision, other countries may follow suit. In that sense, WTO’s image of requiring all nations — large and small — to follow the rules is also on the line.
The U.S.-India Trade Deal
A Pivotal Agreement on Energy and Security
Should the United States Allow Civil Nuclear Trade With India?
(Excerpted From International Debates, January 2007)
On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Sing concluded a historic agreement to strengthen ties between the two nations. Among other things, the two countries pledged to work together to promote democratic values worldwide, combat international terrorism, increase trade, and cooperate on high technology and space research.
The most prominent aspect of the accord was the United States’ offer to assist in the development of the Indian civil nuclear energy program, in exchange for India’s allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of some of its nuclear reactors and agreeing to ensure nonproliferation of its nuclear technology. President Bush and Prime Minister Sing formalized the details of this agreement on March 2, 2006, during President Bush’s state visit to India.
Before the pact could go into effect, however, the U.S. Congress had to pass legislation providing an exception to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which prohibited the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to India. In the past, the U.S. Congress had moved to impose sanctions on India for developing and testing nuclear weapons, and opponents to the new agreement quickly emerged.
During debates in committee and on the House and Senate floor, opponents to the India nuclear accord pointed out that it, in effect, rewarded India for developing nuclear weapons and remaining outside the auspices of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a 1970 international agreement designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. They charged that the agreement would reverse three decades of nonproliferation policy, create a regional arms race with Pakistan, and send the wrong message to aspiring nuclear states, such as North Korea and Iran.
Bush Administration officials and congressional supporters of the pact countered that India’s nuclear program has been a reality since that country’s first test explosion in 1972. Rather than continuing to exclude India from provisions of the NPT and risk alienating a nation with proven nuclear knowledge, they reasoned, it would be better to begin the process of integrating them into the nonproliferation framework.
During debate on the House floor before final passage, Representative Martin Meehan (MA-D) stated that the agreement “is a historic mistake, a mistake that will come back to haunt the United States and the world.” President Bush, during the bill’s signing ceremony, said, “The relationship between the United States and India has never been more vital — and this bill will help us meet the energy and security challenges of the 21st century.” History will judge which statement was more prescient.
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